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Until the entry into force of the new Constitution in 1947, Japanese law
did not recognize the principle of equal protection of the law. The Meiji
Constitution contained no provision for equal protection except for a clause
guaranteeing equal opportunity to public officials.' Under the present
Constitution, the Japanese people have had forty-three years' experience in
pursuing the doctrine of equal protection, introducing its acknowledged
values into the statutory system and striving toward equality in society.
Today, a number of equal protection issues have emerged, both in the
political process and in society as a whole. Court decisions have accumulated
and have produced judicial doctrines, although they are not as well-developed
as in the United States.
This paper will trace the development of the equal protection principle of
the Japanese Constitution over four decades. It will also point out some
significant tendencies, with an emphasis on major litigation.
II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
In advance of case analysis, it will be helpful to look roughly at the
constitutional and statutory provisions related to the equal protection
principle. Article 14, section 1, of the Constitution provides that all people
are equal under the law and forbids discrimination in political, economic, or
social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status, or family origin. The
concept of equality is given more concrete expression than, for instance, in
the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Sections 2 and 3 of
Article 14 prohibit the institution of peerage and its accompanying privileges,
which existed under the Meiji Constitution. Article 26 guarantees the right of
individuals to receive equal educations corresponding to their abilities.
Article 24 declares the equal rights of husband and wife, and the essential
equality of the sexes in family life. Article 44 prohibits discrimination in the
electoral process for representatives of the Diet, and provides that while
qualifications of members of both houses and electors shall be fixed by law,
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1. Article 19 of the Meiji Constitution provided that a Japanese subject would be appointed
equally to civilian or military government service and be able to engage in official government
business in accordance with eligibility provided by statutes and orders.
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there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social status,
family origin, education, property, or income.
From all these provisions, it is clear that the Constitution has the intent to
embed both the concept of equality and the equal protection principle deeply
into all political, economic, and social relations, and to prevent legally
permissible discrimination, which was allowed under the Meiji Constitution.
After the new Constitution was drafted, the government began to enact and
amend statutory laws in accordance with the Constitution's requirement of
equality under the law: The civil law was amended and the sections dealing
with family relationships and inheritance laws were completely changed; 2
Penal Code provisions that impaired the dignity of the individual were
deleted;3 the new Public Officials Election Act enabled all the people to
participate equally in the electoral process;4 and the Labor Standards Act was
also established,5 enjoining employers from discriminating against employees
in wages, hours of labor, and other conditions because of their nationality,
creed, or social status. 6 These are only major examples among many
statutory enactments and amendments. Note, particularly, that the statutory
process was not exhaustive. After these sweeping changes, there remained in
the law provisions of questionable constitutionality under the equal
protection principle. In addition, broad social change has repeatedly raised
new problems relating to equality and has forced reconsideration of what
were regarded as worthwhile statutory corrections.
Two other elements must be considered in viewing the development over
time of the equal protection principle: (1) the insufficiency of postwar
legislation to eliminate old laws incompatible with the equal protection
principle of the new Constitution and (2) postwar social change. Court
decisions provide considerable insight into the development of the equal
protection principle.
The following section analyzes three discrimination issues. The first
analysis deals with the ambiguity arising from suspect classifications related to
"race, creed, sex, social status, or family origin" in Article 14. The second
analysis involves fundamental rights or interests, especially in electoral
reapportionment cases. The third analysis concerns welfare laws where the
equal protection principle is linked to the right to maintain the wholesome
and cultured life guaranteed in Article 25. The first two analyses use the
terminology of United States Supreme Court decisions. The third analysis
combines the first two analyses and adds arguments that are characteristic of
Japanese constitutional law.
2. MINP6 (CIVIL CODE), Law No. 222, 1947.
3. KEIH6 (PENAL CODE) was revised in 1947.
4. The Public Officials Election Act (K6shku Senkyo H6), Law No. 100, 1950.
5. The Labor Standards Act (R6d6 H6), Law No. 49, 1947.
6. Id. art. 3.
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III
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DISCRIMINATORY LAWS AND POLICIES
A. The Patricide Case
In the exercise of judicial review under Article 81 of the Japanese
Constitution, the first Supreme Court decision that held a legislative act
unconstitutional was the patricide case of 1973. 7 The Court denied the
constitutionality of Article 200 of the Penal Code because it provided
discriminatory penalties for different categories of murder. Article 200
prescribes the death penalty or life imprisonment for a person who kills a
lineal ascendant, while Article 199 provides that other cases of murder may be
punished by not less than three years' imprisonment. Similar discrepancies
exist with respect to other offenses against lineal ascendants. 8 These clauses
were not changed when the Penal Code, which provides more severe
punishment for persons who inflict bodily injury resulting in the death of their
own or their spouse's lineal ascendants, was amended after the new
Constitution was promulgated and the clauses have since been challenged
repeatedly.
In 1950, four years after the birth of the new Constitution, the Supreme
Court had an opportunity to review whether Article 205, section 2, of the
Penal Code was constitutional under the equal protection principle. 9 This
clause provides that persons who inflict bodily injury resulting in the death of
their own or their spouse's lineal ascendants shall be punished more severely
than those who inflict similar bodily injury on nonascendants. The lower
court held that the clause unconstitutionally violated the equal protection
principle.' 0 However, the Supreme Court dismissed the lower court decision,
ruling that the clause relating to lineal ascendants reflected a moral postulate,
and that the morality ruling relationships among family members involves a
fundamental truth of universal human morality, and thus is in the realm of
natural law." The Supreme Court rejected the lower court's argument that
the old morality governing family relationships was feudalistic and anti-
democratic, a view that had developed in the early years of the new
Constitution.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's 1950 decision gave a new construction
to the meaning of the provision in the Penal Code regarding more severe
punishment for the murder of ascendants. But the Court's construction was
7. Aizawa v. Japan (The Patricide Case), 27 Keishfi 265 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 4, 1973) (aff'g 1
Keisai Gepp6 544 (Utsunomiya Dist. Ct., May 29, 1969) and rev'g 619 HanreiJih6 93 (Tokyo H. Ct.,
May 12, 1970)).
8. See PENAL CODE, art. 205, § 2; art. 218, § 2; art. 220, § 2.
9. 4 KeishOi 2037 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 11, 1950) (rev k 4 KeishO 2070 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., lizuka
Br. Jan. 9, 1950)).
10. Id. at 2070.
11. Id. at 2126.
EQUAL PROTECTION
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
not persuasive. Criticism of the Court's decision 12 with respect to Article 200
was severe. The decision was handed down immediately after the Article 205
case in 1950 and was based mainly on the reasoning in that case. In the later
case, the Supreme Court seemed so doubtful of the rationale for the severe
difference of penalties between Articles 200 and 199 that it resorted to a
skillful but weakly-based argument in order to avoid applying the more severe
penalty of Article 200 to the accused.' 3 Almost twenty-five years later, the
1973 decision appeared.14
The defendant in the 1973 case was a young woman who had been
sexually abused by her father since she was fourteen. She had borne several
children and was forced to continue the incestuous relationship even after she
had the chance to get married. Driven by a feeling of hopelessness about the
future, she choked her father to death while he was in a drunken sleep. She
was indicted for patricide. The court of first instance held Article 200
unconstitutional and applied Article 199, but exempted her from penalty on
the ground of justifiable self-defense.' 5 On appeal, the higher court
dismissed the district court's decision and sentenced her to three years and six
months in prison. 16 The divergent views of the lower courts on the
constitutionality of Article 200 arose from a difference in their attempts to
reconcile the requirements of Article 200 to the defendant's tragic situation.
The Supreme Court was obliged to seek an answer to this pressing question
under the equal protection principle of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court was divided on the issue of the constitutionality of
Article 200. The majority opinion stated that the Article's purpose was to
punish more severely murderers of lineal ascendants and to deter such crimes
because the murder of ascendants is more a violation of social morality than is
the murder of a stranger; that respect for ascendants is the most fundamental
of social mores and should be protected by the Penal Code; and that
introducing this moral requirement into penal provisions is neither
unreasonable nor an infringement upon Article 14, section 1, of the
Constitution. However, the majority found unreasonable the provision of
Article 200 that imposes the extreme penalty. It concluded that Article 200 of
the Penal Code violated Article 14, section 1, of the Constitution because the
penalty fixed by Article 200-death or life imprisonment-went far beyond
the necessary bounds and was extremely discriminatory when compared to
the penalties fixed by Article 199 in general murder cases.
12. Criticisms of the decision are in case comments such as Takigawa, 200JuRIsTo 104 (1960);
Kakudo,Juristo, in KENPO HANREI HYAKUSEN 21 (1963); Kobayashi, Jurisuto, in KENPONO HANREI 14
(1966).
13. 4 Keish6 2037; see also 11 Keishti 824 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Feb. 2, 1957) (in which the Court said
that a spouse's lineal ascendant in Article 200 meant a living spouse's lineal ascendant and applied
Article 199 to the defendant whose husband was deceased when she committed the crime).
14. 27 Keisha 265.
15. 1 Keisai Gepp6 544.
16. 619 HanreiJih6 93.
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The concurring opinions written by Justice Jiro Tanaka and five other
justices argued that the purpose of Article 200 was on its face unconstitutional
as a violation of the equal protection principle. Justice Shimoda dissented
from both positions and stressed that the determination of the penalty in the
law was a matter of legislative policy, not a constitutional issue.
Soon after the decision, in 1974, a Petty Bench of the Supreme Court held
that Article 205, section 2, of the Penal Code (providing a more severe
punishment for murderers of ascendants) was constitutional. 17 The Petty
Bench followed the majority interpretation of Article 200 in the previously
discussed 1973 Grand Bench decision. Thus, the Supreme Court established
a doctrine on the constitutionality of the Penal Code provisions that treat
differently crimes against lineal ascendants. In brief, this doctrine reads as
follows: The purpose of the provisions is constitutional (that is, to
differentiate between ordinary murder and the murder of ascendants), but the
penalty fixed by law for the murder of ascendants is unconstitutional if the
penalty is extremely severe and disproportionate to that fixed for ordinary
murder.
Legal scholars who agree with the concurring opinion in the 1973 decision
criticize this doctrine. They state that the very purpose of the lineal
ascendants murder provision conflicts with the present Constitution's
principle of equality of every individual's value and dignity, since the law is
rooted in the family morality of Confucianism and supports the prewar family
system (Ie Seido). 18  They also contend that the legislature intended to
maintain the authority-obedience relationship of the old family system
between parents and children, and that the intent gave rise to penalties so
extreme that they cannot be legitimized by the universal morality that the
majority opinion acknowledges. Legal scholars state that the majority opinion
is illogical because once the purpose of the provision was found
constitutional, the choice of penalties should be entrusted to legislative
discretion.
The basis for judicial review adopted by the majority opinion in this case is
also not entirely clear. Since the appeal involved a challenge to the sentence
imposed, the Court should have reviewed the constitutionality issue with a
strict focus on the difference in the punishments for the two types of murder.
According to some scholars, however, the majority seems to have resorted to
an attempt to find a rational basis for differentiating between the two types. 19
Under the 1973 Supreme Court decision, the solution of the problem of
discriminatory punishment was left to the National Diet. The Diet seemingly
had two options: to delete Article 200 from the Penal Code or to amend the
penalties to eliminate the extreme penalties imposed on murderers of lineal
17. 28 Keish6 329 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Sept. 26, 1974).
18. See 6 R. HIRANO, H6RITSUJIHo 55 (1973); Kubota, Sonzoku Satujin ni kansuru Kitei to Hno Moto
no Byddo, 565JURISUTO 9 (1974); Kagawa, Case Comment, 700 HANREIJIH6 172 (1973); Otsuka, Sonzoku
Satsujin ni taisuru Iken Hanketsu wo megutte, 532 JuRISUTO 49 (1973).
19. E.g., Munesue, SonzokuJtibatsu IkenJiken, in H6GAKU SEMINAR ZOKAN KENP6 Sosv6 86-87 (H.
Zokan ed. 1983); Kichi Yokota. Grisei no Kijun, in 2 K6ZA KENP6 Sos'6 184 (N. Ashibe ed. 1987).
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ascendants. So far, however, the Diet has not altered Article 200. The Diet's
failure to act in accord with the Court's decision is primarily due to the
difficulty of reaching a consensus among the Diet's members, especially those
belonging to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.
In practice, public prosecutors have adopted the policy that they will not
prosecute under Article 200. As a consequence, the crime of lineal ascendant
murder has effectively disappeared. The longer this situation continues, the
more established becomes the practice that murder cases are limited to those
of ordinary murder under Article 199. Whether the equal protection
principle permits such a contradiction between statutory provisions and
prosecutorial practice remains for the Supreme Court and the Diet to decide.
B. Gender and Creed Discrimination
The cases discussed above have emerged in the development of the equal
protection principle as it relates to the classification of suspects in the crime of
murder. Other cases deal with discrimination according to gender and creed.
The most important case in which the Supreme Court adjudicated claims
of gender discrimination is the Nissan Car Corporation case. 20 Nissan had a
rule requiring women to retire five years earlier than men. Nine women
employees were fired by the company for protesting the rule. The fired
employees sued, alleging that the rule should be nullified because it conflicted
with Article 90 of the Civil Code, which provides that any juristic act contrary
to public policy or good morals is null and void. Both the district court and
high court held that the rule violated Article 90. In 1981, the Supreme Court
agreed, stating that the rule unreasonably affected women employees as a
group, on the assumption that their capacity for work decreases earlier than
that of men, without consideration of individual circumstances.
In this case, the plaintiffs did not directly allege violation of the equal
protection principle because the issue involved relationships between private
parties. However, the equal protection principle was used in order to
interpret the meaning of public order or good morals mandated by Article 90
of the Civil Code. The Supreme Court announced in this case that the equal
protection principle should be applied to matters of civil law. The Court thus
established the doctrine that treatment based predominantly on the grounds
of sex constitutes unreasonable discrimination.
Until this 1981 Supreme Court decision, the lower courts had often held
that discriminatory labor conditions against women employees were illegal.
But the Supreme Court's doctrine provided a broad, firm basis for application
of the equal protection principle to matters of gender discrimination. It is not
clear, however, whether this judicial doctrine will be applied to all legal
actions in society, and to what extent judicial scrutiny will be applied to
gender discrimination. Furthermore, it is not clear whether this doctrine
applies to de facto discrimination as well as to legal actions.
20. 35 Minshi 300 (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B., Mar. 24, 1981).
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Discrimination against women has become a lively topic in Japan recently.
For example, the Diet has passed several statutes, such as the Equal
Opportunity for Employment Law2 1 and amendments of the Nationality Law
and the Family Register Law, 22 designed to require equal treatment for
women. These enactments should strengthen the judicial doctrine of equality
before the law.
The last case to be discussed in this context is also a civil suit, the
Mitsubishi Jushi Corporation case. 23 A university graduate was employed by
the Mitsubishi Jushi Corporation, a leading company in Japan. The company
refused to appoint him as a regular employee after his three-month training
period because he allegedly failed to record in his personal history his
membership in a student political group. The student sued the company,
claiming that its failure to employ him discriminated against him on the basis
of his political beliefs. Although the lower courts ruled in his favor, the
Supreme Court in 1973 overturned the high court decision. The Court held
that the principle of private autonomy was controlling in private relationships
where it was necessary to reconcile the economic freedom of a corporation
with the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental freedom and equality of the
individual. The Court indicated that the company enjoyed the freedom of
contract and was therefore free, in the absence of statutory or other
regulations, to determine whom it would employ, and under what conditions
that employment would take place. Therefore, it could not be illegal and
unconstitutional for the company to refuse employment to an individual
because of his political beliefs. The Court supported its reasoning by holding
that Article 14 of the Constitution did not directly apply to the private
relationship involved, and that Article 3 of the Labor Standards Act,24 which
prohibits discriminatory treatment by a company because of an employee's
nationality, creed, or social status, applies to labor conditions after
employment but not to the act of employment itself.
This Supreme Court decision has provoked much discussion by legal
scholars. Special attention should be paid to the Court's attitude toward
gender and creed discrimination in private social relationships. In the two
discrimination cases described above, the Court was more assertive in
reviewing gender discrimination than creed discrimination. In the former
case, the Court provided relief to the female plaintiffs even though the Labor
Standards Law contained no provision regarding gender discrimination,
except for a prohibition of wage discrimination against women. In the latter
case, the Court intervened between the employer and the employee to the
disadvantage of the latter, setting limits on the prohibition of creed
discrimination in the Labor Standards Act. Because creed discrimination
21. The Equal Opportunity for Employment Law (Danjo Koy6 Kikai Kint6 H6), Law No. 45,
1985.
22. The Law to Amend Parts in the Nationality Law and the Family Register Law (Kokuseki H6
oyobi Koseki H6 no Ichibu wo Kaisei suru H6ritsu), Law No. 45, 1984.
23. 27 Minshu 1536 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 12, 1973).
24. See Labor Standards Act, supra note 5.
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cases may lead to controversies involving political ideology, the Court is apt
to take a cautious attitude in disposing of such disputes. On the other hand,
the Supreme Court took a relatively active attitude in gender discrimination
cases and in the lineal ascendants murder cases, which did not immediately
raise political issues. It may be that the Supreme Court recognizes changing
social attitudes about gender and family, but not differences in political creed
in the employment context.
IV
COURT ENFORCEMENT OF EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE POLITICAL
PROCESS: THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES
The realization of equality in the political process is one of the major
requirements of the Constitution, as was indicated in the overview of
constitutional provisions in Part I. There has been at least some progress in
reapportionment cases.
The Supreme Court has delivered five decisions in apportionment cases
involving both houses of the Diet; in two decisions, the Court held
unconstitutional the apportionment for seats in the House of
Representatives. 25 In the history of judicial review under the present
Constitution, it is striking to note that, of the six cases in which the Supreme
Court has held a legislative act unconstitutional, one-third of them involve
reapportionment cases. 26
The 1964 decision by the Supreme Court led the way for the later
development of reapportionment cases. 27 In the 1964 case, voters claimed
that in some House of Councillors election districts, it took four times the
number of voters to elect one candidate than in other districts, and that this
malapportionment violated the constitutional principle of equal protection.
On that ground, the plaintiffs sought to have the election of July 1962
declared void. The Supreme Court affirmed the high court's holding that
suits demanding nullification of elections on grounds of malapportionment
were justiciable under Article 204 of the Public Officials Election Act, even
though the Act did not originally anticipate that kind of suit. Upholding the
constitutionality of the apportionment ratio established by law, the Supreme
Court ruled that such matters were in principle entrusted to the discretionary
power of the Diet as the sole lawmaking organ and that, in deciding such
matters, the Diet could consider not only population, but also other elements,
such as the size and history of electoral districts and the balancing of
25. Kanao v. Hiroshima Election Mgmt. Comm'n, 39 Minsh6 1100 (Sup. Ct., G.B., July 17,
1985); Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Comm'n, 30 Minshfi 223 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 14,
1976).
26. The other four decisions are Hiraguchi v. Hiraguchi, 41 Minsha 408 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 22,
1987) (partition requirement for a forest owned in common under the Forest Law); Umehara v.
Japan (The Pharmacy Case), 29 Minshu 572 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 30, 1975) (distance requirement
under the Pharmaceutical Law): 27 Keishui 265 (the Patricide Case); 16 Keish6i 1593 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
Nov. 28, 1962) (confiscation of third party's property).
27. Koshiyama v. Tokyo Election Mgmt. Comm'n, 18 Minsh5i 270 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Feb. 5, 1964).
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representation among local administrative districts. Later malapportionment
cases have been based on these holdings.
The 1976 Grand Bench decision 28 held that an approximately one to five
deviation in the ratio of voters between rural and urban areas per Diet
member in the House of Representatives was constitutionally impermissible
and beyond the limits of the legislature's discretionary power. The Supreme
Court emphasized in its reasoning that the right to vote has great historical
significance as a product of popular political struggle and that the
constitutional provision for equal protection of the law was aimed at a
thorough equalization of voting rights, so that the people should be equal in
the enjoyment of their political values. Therefore, the Court asserted that the
Constitution not only prohibits discrimination in qualifications for electors
but also requires equality in the value of the vote of every elector. The
Supreme Court shifted gears at the next step, however, stating that equality in
the value of the vote cannot be determined in mathematical terms alone.
Without proceeding to a strict scrutiny of the constitutionality of
malapportionment, the Court recognized the discretionary power of the
legislature in fixing the rate of apportionment. Allowing for those elements
that the Diet could take into consideration, the Supreme Court judged that
deviation was constitutionally impermissible only if it went beyond the limits
of the legislature's discretionary power.
The Court's judgment also considered whether the Diet had corrected the
malapportionment within a reasonable time. This analysis means that the
apportionment challenged as unconstitutional is not to be so considered if a
reasonable time for revision by the Diet had not yet elapsed. Because the rate
challenged in this case had been in effect for more than eight years, the
Supreme Court concluded that it was unconstitutional.
Furthermore, in this case, the Supreme Court devised a method called
"circumstance decision" for announcing its decision. That is to say, the Court
held only that the apportionment rate in question was unconstitutional but
did not declare the election void because of the circumstances created by
nullification of the election. This type of decision does not deal with the
interpretation of specific statutes but is based only on the general principles
of law.2 9
The judicial doctrines produced through those two Grand Bench decisions
had considerable impact on subsequent reapportionment debates, both in
society at large and in the political and judicial spheres. It is important that
the Court opened the gate for additional suits challenging legislative
apportionments. While the Diet has been reluctant to make drastic revisions
of the apportionment rate, citizens have continued to challenge the rate in the
courts. The Supreme Court's decisions produced no clear standard for
28. 30 MinshGi 223.
29. Article 31 of the Administrative Cases Procedure Act stipulates the method of circumstance
decision, but Article 219 of the Public Officials Election Act does not apply it correspondingly.
Therefore, the Court relied upon the general principles of law.
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determining constitutionally permissible differences in apportionment; as a
result, confusion has occurred in the high court decisions. For instance, one
court held constitutional a certain degree of difference and another held
unconstitutional the same degree of difference.30 Because the device of the
circumstance decision does not immediately force the Diet to follow the
Supreme Court's holding, unconstitutional violations of the equal protection
principle in apportionment have been continuing.
Criticism of the Supreme Court's position was aroused when in 1983 it
handed down a decision 3' holding constitutional the rate of apportionment
on the grounds that a reasonable amount of time had not elapsed since the
last revision, even though the Court acknowledged unconstitutionality
inherent within the apportionment scheme. Five years had passed from the
1975 revision of the apportionment rate until the election ofJune 1980, which
was at issue in this decision. Some critics felt that five years was more than
enough time for the Diet to have made revisions. The Supreme Court
remarked that the decrease of the rate of deviation in apportionment from the
earlier rate of 1 to 4.83, to the later rate of 1 to 2.92 had eliminated the
unconstitutionality of the situation. Some people wondered whether the
Supreme Court had established that an approximately 1 to 3 deviation was
constitutionally acceptable. It can be said at least that the Supreme Court was
thinking of a less strict standard of deviation, for it did not accept the high
court's assertion in this case that a deviation of more than 1 to 2 violated the
equal protection principle. 32 Furthermore, the Court expressed a strong
expectation that the Diet would revise as early as possible the deviation rate,
which was 1 to 3.94 at the time of the decision. This was only an expectation,
however, with no legally binding force.
Then, on July 17, 1985, a Grand Bench decision 33 came down, again
holding the apportionment rate unconstitutional. On this day, the Supreme
Court dealt with appeals from the high courts in Sapporo, Tokyo, Osaka, and
Hiroshima, all of which had held the apportionment rate for members of the
House of Representatives unconstitutional, relying on the device of
circumstance decision. The deviation was 1 to 4.40 at the time of the election
of December 1983. In light of precedents, the Supreme Court's decision was
not regarded as a landmark. The Supreme Court expressed irritation at the
Diet's slow reaction to the Court's holding in the form of a circumstance
decision. Four justices joined in an opinion emphasizing that the Diet should
correct the apportionment rate as soon as possible and warning that the Court
30. See decisions of Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 11, 1978.
31. Tokyo Metropolitan Election Comm'n v. Koshiyama, 37 Minsh5i 1243 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov.
7, 1983) (rev'g 984 Hanrei Jiho 26 (Tokyo H. Ct., Dec. 23, 1980)). For criticisms, see Koshiyama,
Nonaka & Yoshida, Shtin Teiszi-Haibun Dai-Hdtei Hanketsu to Saiksai, in 2 H6GAKU SEMINAR 16 (1984);
Shinohara, Ashibe & Uchida, Shtigiin Dai-Httei Hanketsu to Daihydsei no arikata, 806 JURISUTO 6 (1984);
Takahashi, Tesun Fukinko Sosyj no Hanrei Riron no Genkyj to Mondaiten, 42 HOGAU Kv6SHIrSU 95 (1984);
Toshihiko Nonaka, Shzigiin-Giin Teisd Dai-Htei Hanketsu no Igi to Mondaiten, 806 JURISUTO 21 (1984).
32. 984 Hanrei Jih6 26.
33. 39 Minsha5 1100.
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might render a decision nullifying a future election if it were held without any
correction in the apportionment rate. If the Court does so, it will have
inspired a law. However, as it was anticipated at the time of this decision that
the Diet would soon revise the apportionment rate, it was not expected that
the Court would carry out its threatened action.
The decisions discussed above concern reapportionment cases for
members of the House of Representatives. As to the cases involving elections
of the members of the House of Councillors, no progress has been made by
the Supreme Court. The Court has recognized very wide discretionary power
in the Diet to determine apportionment in upper house elections. The
Court's main reasoning centers on the different characters of the two houses.
In its 1983 decision, 34 the Court declared that the establishment of electoral
procedure for the House of Councillors is a matter of legislative policy.
Therefore, the Court affirmed that the requirement of the equality of the
value of the vote in elections for the House of Councillors was not as strong as
in elections for the House of Representatives, which are based upon
apportionment determined by population.
As a matter of fact, the nature of the House of Councillors has been
controversial since the Constitution substituted it for the old House of Peers.
The Supreme Court can be faulted, however, for not providing more
persuasive reasoning to justify the 1 to 5 difference in apportionment that was
at issue in the 1983 case.
It is interesting that the Supreme Court has ordered considerably tighter
requirements in apportionment for the election of members of local
government assemblies.5 5 In such cases, the Supreme Court does not have to
apply the equal protection principle directly to a malapportionment situation
because Article 15, section 2, of the Public Officials Election Law provides
that apportionment for local government assemblies should be fixed by
ordinance in proportion to the population. It is clear that this provision is in
accord with the Constitution's equal protection principle and that the
Supreme Court is capable of affirming a statutory provision designed to
realize the constitutional principle. However, the Court has taken a prudent
attitude in applying the constitutional principle directly to such cases.
Eventually, the Court will be obliged to indicate its own understanding of the
constitutional issue involved. However, this reluctance to apply a
constitutional principle directly to cases is a typical tendency of the Supreme
Court in its exercise of judicial review.
34. Shimizu v. Osaka Election Comm'n, 37 Minsh6i 345 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 27, 1983).
35. See, e.g., 38 Minshfi 721 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., May 17, 1984).
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V
THE APPLICATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLE TO
WELFARE RIGHTS
The right to maintain the minimum standards of "wholesome and cultured
living" in Article 25 of the Constitution has been the subject of controversy
among constitutional scholars since its adoption. The main issue in scholarly
discussions is whether Article 25 sets forth only the government's
responsibility for protecting the right or guarantees the substance of the right.
The guarantee of the right, some think, depends on which view the Court
holds when the constitutionality of welfare laws is challenged. However, there
has been little discussion of how the equal protection principle relates to
welfare cases. In other words, many scholars think that to question the
constitutionality of certain welfare statutes is to ask the meaning of Article
25.36
The Horiki case of 198237 was the first case in which the Supreme Court
tried to answer the question of how the equal protection principle applies to
welfare rights. The plaintiff in this case challenged the constitutionality of a
provision in the Juvenile Allowance Law3 8 that denied an allowance to a
mother who received welfare benefits for her physical handicap under the
National Annuity Law.39 The district court held this provision's ban on dual
benefits unconstitutional, 40 stating that it violated the equal protection
provisions of the Constitution because it discriminated against a family
consisting of a mother and a child receiving welfare benefits for her physical
handicap as compared to a three-member family including a father or a
healthy mother with a child seeking the same benefit. This decision by the
district court strongly influenced the Diet, which deleted the provision from
the Juvenile Allowance Law. The Welfare Ministry, however, pressured the
governor, who was in charge of welfare administration, to appeal the case.
The nature of the case then shifted from the propriety of providing the
indigent physically handicapped mother with a remedy under the equal
protection principle to the general responsibility of the government to make
real the right to "wholesome . . . living" guaranteed in Article 25.
Dismissing the district court decision, the high court focused its reasoning
on the meaning of Article 25.41 It determined that section 2 of Article 25,
which covered the Juvenile Allowance Law, set forth the government's
36. See, e.g., A. OsuKA, SEIZONKEN RON (1984); Fujii, Seizon toJinken, in 2 KENP6 KOGi 229 (A.
Osuka ed., 1979); Nakamura, HJno moto no Byido to "Giriteki Sabetsu, "45 K6H6 KENKYO 40, 45 (1983).
37. Horiki v. Governor of Hyogo Prefecture, 36 Minshfi 1235 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,July 7, 1982) (rev g
23 Gy6shfi 711 (Kobe Dist. Ct., Sept. 20, 1972) and aff'g 26 Gy6shi 1268 (Osaka H. Ct., Nov. 10,
1975)).
38. The Juvenile Allowance Law (Jido Fuy6 Teate Ho), Law No. 238, 1961, art. 4, § 3, n.3.
Under Article 4, section 1, of the Juvenile Allowance Law, a divorced mother who brings up her
children is entitled to the benefit.
39. The National Annuity Law (Kokumin Nenkin H6), Law No. 141, 1959.
40. 23 Gy6shii 711.
41. 26 Gy6sha 1268.
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responsibility for enacting affirmative policies to prevent poverty, while
section 1 covered the government's responsibility to adopt specific,
supplementary policies to relieve existing poverty. With this understanding,
the court stated that it was not for judicial decision but for legislative
discretion to determine the wisdom of the legal provision banning dual
benefits, and concluded that, by enacting this provision, the legislature had
neither departed excessively from its discretionary power nor abused its
power.
Although the Supreme Court ignored the high court's doctrine regarding
the difference between sections 1 and 2 of Article 25, it too granted the
legislature wide discretionary power in determining welfare policies. The
Court unanimously stated that the determination of how to take a particular
legislative action under the intent of Article 25 was entrusted to the wide
discretion of the Diet, and that it was improper for the court to review the
Diet's action unless it was found to be extremely unreasonable and a clear
departure from, and an abuse of, its discretionary power.
The Supreme Court in the Horiki case established for the first time a
doctrine on the relationship between Article 25's guarantee of the right to
wholesome living and the provisions of the welfare law. That is, the guarantee
of Article 25 depends largely upon the legislature's wide discretion. But this
doctrine could have been anticipated in light of the Court's obiter dictum in
the Asahi case, 42 where the Court suggested that Article 25, section 1, of the
Constitution did not directly guarantee a right to be enjoyed by each
individual, but only set forth a government responsibility in the matter.
Avoiding reference to the Asahi case, the Court in the Horiki case depended
upon the Food Control Law case of 194843 as precedent for its doctrine. This
precedent is questionable, however, because the Food Control Law case was a
criminal case, not civil as in Horiki, and the Law's purpose was to distinguish
between the people's economic activities and their welfare rights.
Nevertheless, the Court's assertion in the Horiki case made it clear that the
guarantee of Article 25 does not enjoy strong judicial protection. The only
resort is judicial relief under the equal protection principle.
After its judgment on the right to wholesome living, the Supreme Court
added remarks on the equal protection issue. It said that regarding the
receipt of the juvenile allowance, even though the application of the provision
banning dual benefits discriminated between a handicapped person such as
the appellant and a nonhandicapped person, the discrimination could not be
judged as without reasonable grounds under the total consideration of all
factors that might be involved in such a case.
42. Asahi v. Minister of Health and Welfare, 21 MinshOi 1043 (Sup. Ct., G.B., May 24, 1967)
(rev g 14 Gy6shu 53 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Oct. 19, 1960) and aff'g 21 Minshci 1043 (Tokyo H. Ct., Nov. 4,
1963)).
43. 2 Keishu 1235 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Sept. 29, 1948); see also The Food Control Act (Shokury6
Kanri H6), Law No. 40, 1942.
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Such brief statements are not sufficient to establish precise legal doctrines
on the equal protection principle as applied to welfare cases. At least,
however, the Supreme Court has admitted that alleged violations of the equal
protection principle can be used as the basis for bringing welfare suits,
whether or not violation of the Article 25 guarantee is involved. The Court
also indicated in this case that the standard for judicial scrutiny should be no
more than a rationality test. This test seems to be derived from the Court's
finding of a classification under the Juvenile Allowance Law. As described
above, the Supreme Court found that the classification involved in the law was
the one between a nonhandicapped person and a person who, like the
appellant, was handicapped and thus eligible for a benefit. This finding makes
an interesting contrast with the district court's finding that discrimination
existed between a family of a single-parent mother and child receiving welfare
benefits for the physically handicapped mother and a two-parent, three-
member family of a handicapped father receiving the benefit or a
nonhandicapped single-parent mother who was bringing up a child receiving
the benefit. The district court seems to have found gender discrimination in
the law. This may represent a misinterpretation of the law, however; some
commentators doubt whether the two-parent, three-member family
mentioned is in the same class or category as the single-parent plaintiff of the
case. It is worth asking, however, whether the Supreme Court would apply a
stricter standard of scrutiny if it found gender discrimination in the welfare
statute. Of course, the Court in the Horiki case did not refer to this question,
which remains to be settled by future cases.
There is one lower court decision that involves gender discrimination in
welfare cases. In the Makino case,44 the plaintiff, Makino, was a housewife who
was due to receive an old-age pension at the age of seventy, under the
National Annuity Law. 45 Makino alleged that the married couple limitation
clause of the law, under which her pension was reduced because her husband
was already receiving a full pension benefit, was unconstitutional. The district
court held the clause unconstitutional, stating that it could not find any
reasonable ground for discrimination on the pension eligibility between the
wife in a marriage and a single woman without considering their real
situations. This provision of the law seemed to be based on the assumption
that an old married couple would need a smaller pension than two single
people. Consequently, the classification challenged in this case may not have
directly involved gender discrimination. It is not impossible, however, to find
an assumption behind the classification that the wife could exist on her
husband's income and therefore should accept a smaller pension. This
reasoning paralleled the reasoning in the Horiki case on the equal protection
principle.
The Makino case ended at the district court level, because the Diet deleted
the married couple limitation clause from the law, and the governor
44. Makino v. Japan, 19 Gy6sh5i 1196 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., July 15, 1968).
45. See National Annuity Law, supra note 39.
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responsible for administering the law did not appeal the case. The same issue
was decided contrary to the Makino case, however, by lower courts. 46
Therefore, the Supreme Court was expected to explain its opinion clearly
enough so that the welfare law and the equal protection principle would be
reconciled. That did not happen in the Horiki case.
Subsequent events have proved disappointing. The Supreme Court has
used the Horiki case as a precedent to dispose of all welfare cases47 and has
taken a hands-off attitude toward welfare cases. At present, no new
developments in the application of the equal protection principle to welfare
cases can be expected.
VI
CONCLUSION
The discrimination decisions described above are confined to major cases.
Other types of discrimination, such as discrimination against foreigners, in
economic activities, and against taxpayers have also come under judicial
scrutiny. The courts have handled them in ways indistinguishable from those
in the major cases discussed here. Therefore, in the light of the three areas of
discrimination described so far, I will summarize how the equal protection
principle in the Japanese Constitution has had an impact on discrimination,
and point out some problems to be solved.
Two elements in the development of the equal protection principle were
mentioned in Part II of this Article. The first element, insufficiency of postwar
legislative actions against laws incompatible with the equal protection
principle of the new Constitution, is clearly revealed in the patricide cases.
The Supreme Court took time to affirm the equal protection principle in the
provisions of the Penal Code, but the result is unsatisfactory because the
challenged provision still remains in the Penal Code.
The second element, which is social change, is closely related to the first.
Typical examples are found in gender discrimination and reapportionment
cases. In gender discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has rejected
traditional antifemale assumptions, thus seemingly adopting society's
changing consciousness of women's positions. In reapportionment cases,
voters discontented with malapportionment arising from population changes
in cities and rural areas called upon the Court to equalize the value of the
vote. The Court responded more favorably than in other areas of
discrimination. A full solution depends on action by the Diet to conform to
the Court's decision.
Thus, the interrelationship between the judiciary, on the one hand, and
the political divisions, that is, the Diet and the executive branch, on the other
hand, will play a determining role in making the equal protection principle a
46. 27 Gy6shii 1836 (Osaka H. Ct., Dec. 17, 1976); 25 Gy6shai 1395 (Kobe Dist. Ct., Oct. 11,
1974).
47. Those decisions are not even registered in the Minshfi.
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reality. In reapportionment cases, the Supreme Court did not directly attack
malapportionment. Instead, the Court recognized the Diet's discretionary
power, established loose standards-such as a reasonable time for action and
a I to 3 deviation rate in apportionment-and further created the device of
"circumstance decision." In addition, the Court has expressed irritation with
the Diet's slow compliance with its decisions.
In welfare cases, although the lower court decisions48 required immediate
compliance by legislative and administrative branches of government, the
Supreme Court has been highly deferential to the government's welfare
policies and has exercised restraint in its relations with government
organizations. Its hands-off attitude has convinced indigent people that they
cannot expect judicial remedies for their plight. Similarly, the Court relies
fully upon the political process to eliminate malapportionment in the House
of Councillors. All in all, the judiciary has been reluctant to assume
leadership in projecting the values of the equal protection principle into the
political and social relationships of society.
Against the background of this tendency, it is possible to analyze judicial
doctrines regarding the equal protection principle. The Supreme Court
employs the test of rationality, or mild scrutiny, in reviewing constitutionality
in equal protection cases. It has never resorted to strict judicial scrutiny and
has been reluctant to develop standards from which heightened judicial
scrutiny might be derived. The Court recognizes that it would be very
difficult to obtain compliance from the political divisions even if it took more
drastic stands for the solution of equality issues. Thus, as demonstrated in the
patricide and reapportionment cases, the equal protection principle in the
Japanese Constitution is developing slowly and gradually.
Even so, the development of the equal protection principle has promoted
the significance of human rights guaranteed in Chapter 3 of the Constitution.
As mentioned above, three of six Supreme Court decisions that have declared
laws unconstitutional invalidated statutory provisions relating to the equal
protection principle. The Court also extended the equal protection principle
to gender discrimination among private parties. This trend in the judiciary is
expected to extend to other fields of constitutional litigation, especially
freedom of expression and religious liberty.
48. See, e.g., 984 Hanrei Jih6 26.
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